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Moral Political Dissent in German-Czech Relations* 
JAN PAUER** 
Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen, Germany 
Abstract: Since 1989, the German-Czech relationship has been burdened by the 
problem of a just assessment of World War II and the following forced transfer of 
the Sudeten Germans. Why are democrats on both sides, who acknowledge the same 
values and principles, unable to reach an agreement about crucial events in the past? 
The political and legal differences imply a moral dissent which is not being dis-
cussed systematically. The article tries to investigate the deficits of the moral argu-
ments on both sides. 
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1. Problems with the Recognition Controversy 
When in 1989/1990 Václav Havel publicly expressed a moral apology for the expulsion 
of Germans from post-war Czechoslovakia, he hardly suspected that the very foundations 
of détente policy – which had been interpreted by East Europeans as a German step to-
wards reconciliation, based on their acknowledgement of the political status quo resulting 
from World War II – could ever be questioned. German unification was seen as the sine 
qua non of peaceful European integration and was consequently welcomed with some-
thing approaching euphoria. It was not only because of the East German and Czech 
(Czechoslovakian) revolutions of November 1989 that Václav Havel selected Munich and 
Berlin as the destinations for his first foreign trips. His apology was intended as a gesture 
which would contribute to overcoming the burdens of the past and reflected the policy 
later advocated by the Czech government, i.e. making a clean break with the past, at least 
on a political and legal level. 
If the only reactions to Havel’s apology had been the amiable reply of then German 
Federal President Weizsäcker and the prompt signing of a new friendship treaty between 
the two neighbours, many of the tensions which later arose would have been avoided. But 
the Sudeten Germans, the audience which Havel was in fact addressing, were – at least as 
far as their strongest public voice, the Sudetendeutsche Landsmanschaft (SL), was con-
cerned – incapable of a similarly generous gesture. Instead, Havel’s words were inter-
preted as a Czech “admission of guilt”, which must be followed by practical steps 
                                                     
*) Due to lack of space, part of the original text of this article was excluded. This part described 
and assessed the typology of moral discourses (e.g. the Christian ethic of forgiving, the ‘ius tali-
onis’ ethic, discourse from the point of view of the victim, the sceptical use of morality and war as 
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cles on German-Czech relations. This text is based on a study entitled Moralischer Diskurs und die 
Deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen carried out at the Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Univer-
sität Bremen (Research Institute for Eastern Europe at the University of Bremen). A German ver-
sion (Moralisch-politischer Dissens in den deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen) was published in 
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towards the legal and material compensation of the Sudeten Germans. The SL demanded 
compensation amounting to hundreds of billions of German marks and their spokesperson 
declared that they would not be “bought off” with a mere moral apology. The Sudeten 
German organisation, vigorously supported by its patron, the Bavarian government, is-
sued threats in the event of the Czech government not entering into a ‘dialogue’ with the 
‘Sudeten Germans’. For example, co-operation in constructing a oil pipeline from Ingol-
stadt, which was intended to reduce the one-sided dependence of the Czech Republic on 
Soviet, later Russian, crude oil imports, was linked to Czech willingness to begin negotia-
tions. Moreover, the Czechs were reminded of their dependence on German support for 
their bid to join the EU. The Sudeten Germans also called for the annulment of the so-
called Beneš decrees, i.e. for the legal revision of the Czech internal policy regarding 
‘expulsion’ (Vertreibung). The SL continues to insist on its “right to a homeland”, even 
though such a right is neither upheld by current German jurisprudence, nor by interna-
tional law, and despite the fact that it is unclear what legal rights and consequences would 
result from such a right. When, eventually, doubts were cast on the very integrity of a 
moral apology to the victims of violence and compulsory expulsion, on grounds that 
moral condemnation was only convincing if it was followed by appropriate legal meas-
ures, one might have easily been left with the impression that these arguments could not 
have originated in a country where no Nazi judges have ever been convicted, and where 
up until now the courts have turned down every individual legal claim filed by foreign 
victims of Nazis terror or of forced labour. And all this occurred while German pensions 
were still being paid to SS veterans who are citizens of countries other than Germany. 
Although the Bonn government signed a new friendship treaty with the Czech Re-
public in 1993, the treaty expressly left open the question of eventual material claims 
arising as a result of the expropriation of the Sudeten Germans’ property. This was the 
consequence of German law, according to which the Federal Government of Germany 
becomes responsible for fulfilling the compensation claims of its citizens, if it publicly 
renounces the private legal claims of its citizens against any second country. This well-
known provision of German law – which some lawyers have interpreted to mean that 
‘only’ the level of compensation paid thus far to German citizens by the German govern-
ment might be open to re-negotiation – and the potentially incalculable financial risks 
which it opened up were the cause of the Federal Government’s cautious position. Al-
though this is in essence a non-political legal ruling which would also apply to the Czech 
government under the conditions of the rule of law, it has been perceived by the Czech 
public as a indication that in the future the German government could, if a favourable 
situation arose, again open negotiations on this issue. Czech politicians and the Czech 
public lost sight of the fact that the German Federal Government had good reasons for 
preventing renewed bilateral negotiations on the issue of individual compensation claims. 
Such Czech-German negotiations would have meant that the question of war reparations 
to the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe would come up at the in-
ternational negotiating table, as provided in the London treaty on debts of 1953. In view 
of the enormous number of war victims and the enormity of material losses in this region, 
the German government, as the legal successor to the German Reich, would have then 
faced costs far exceeding other financial risks calculated in this context. Ex-Foreign Min-
ister Kinkel’s soothing words to the associations of displaced Germans (Vertriebenenver-
bände) to the effect that “the time is not yet ripe for your claims”, the often hasty, morally 
motivated demands of several German politicians calling for the cancellation of the Beneš 
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decrees, and the active demands of the SL for restitution and compensation, which no 
representative of German politics contradicted, all served to cause agitation in Prague and 
in the border regions. 
The Czech government’s trust in the German interpretation of the legal situation 
was hardly strengthened by the fact that the Federal Government explicitly refused, from 
the point of view of international rights, to acknowledge the Potsdam Agreement of 1945; 
it declared, on the one hand, the Munich Agreement to be “legally binding”, but, on the 
other, refused to accept the analogous argument in relation to Potsdam. Likewise, the 
trust of the Czech side was not reinforced by the fact that the Federal Government and 
German Constitutional Court confirmed the validity of compulsory expropriation in the 
former GDR at the end of the war but refused to acknowledge compulsory expropriation 
in post-war Czechoslovakia as a valid and irreversible outcome of World War II. Suspi-
cions grew that the international legality of the transfer (Potsdam) might first be negated 
and then – on the basis of ‘Czech guilt’ – doubts cast on the internal legal basis (the 
Beneš decrees). This would have opened the way for Sudeten German demands. An ava-
lanche of Sudeten German restitution lawsuits at a time when the legal system was in 
danger of collapsing would have blocked the process of privatisation and contributed to 
tension in the country. In connection with Bonn’s demand that the SL be involved in bi-
lateral talks with the Prague government, the Czech side was left with the impression that 
the now sovereign Germany was systematically attempting to revise the outcome of 
World War II. Thanks to the special treatment of Poland, the Czech Republic increasingly 
perceived its position as that of the ‘weakest link’ within the former East European com-
munity. The simultaneous division of Czechoslovakia and reunification of Germany, 
together with Austria’s entry into the European Community, revived old, historically 
well-founded fears of a new and powerful Greater Germany in Prague. The word injustice 
(Unrecht) itself, which German politicians of all persuasions use in connection with ex-
pulsion, suddenly took on a double meaning: besides meaning injustice in the moral 
sense, it might also mean – without any legal basis whatsoever. 
In the Czech Republic, this suspicion was not only prevalent among nationalists 
and communists, but gradually pervaded democratic political groups as well. Increasing 
mistrust in the long-term aims of German politics among the Czech public was, in itself, 
the really disturbing development. In view of the fact that the Bonn government actually 
neither intended to unilaterally revise the post-war order in Europe, nor aimed to launch 
an offensive on the compensation question – which would have been absurd, not only 
from the German point of view – leads one to ask why their real intentions were so diffi-
cult to decipher and how such an impression could ever arise in the Czech Republic. The 
whole situation is all the more puzzling if one recalls that the Federal Republic is a reli-
able partner and supporter of Czech integration into the West. 
Czech politics reacted by ‘consolidating’ its own legal and political positions, with 
the intention of warding off what were presumed to be Bonn’s attempts at revision. The 
first step was the Czech Parliament’s background report on the German-Czech Treaty of 
1992. The second step, of much greater significance than this political statement by Par-
liament, was the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (1995) up-
holding the “legality” and “legitimacy” of the so-called Beneš decrees and confirming 
their legal validity, at the same time it denied their present-day applicability. The Czech 
government subsequently requested the opinions of the former Allied powers on the issue 
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of the validity and international legal status of the Potsdam Agreement in 1996 and re-
ceived replies from those countries, ambassadors which met with Prague’s expectations. 
The Czech government also contributed to the clouding of Czech-German rela-
tions. One must merely recall the obvious discrepancy between the Czech offer of dual 
nationality for Sudeten Germans made in 1990/91 and the current rejection of a dialogue 
with representatives of the SL. In the meantime, the Prague government offered to enter 
into a dialogue after the traditional Whitsuntide meeting of the SL in 1993, despite sharp 
and demanding tones voiced there, and retracted this offer three days later, arguing that 
the speeches of SL representatives had rendered dialogue impossible. All of this was little 
help in clarifying Czech policy. The fact that the Speaker of the Czech Parliament, Milan 
Uhde, rejected a inter-parliamentary dialogue during a visit to Bonn in the same year 
contributed to producing the most significant shortcoming of the Joint Declaration on 
Conciliation later agreed upon – its insufficient political legitimacy. It was this lack of 
dialogue, which became strikingly obvious in existing political, legal, and normative 
evaluations of the Czech-German common past, which finally led to the Czech idea of a 
Joint Declaration of Reconciliation. Two years of secret diplomacy and hard work on the 
part of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of both countries were necessary before in 1997 this 
platform for “international understanding” was created in the form of a rational text 
which contributed to improving mutual relationships. Czech hopes for a legal end to the 
demands for compensation went unfulfilled, for well-known reasons. The German Fed-
eral Government acknowledged what had been common knowledge before the declara-
tion, namely, that the past would not be a hindrance on the Czech Republic’s path into the 
EU and NATO. Finally, despite the convergence of standpoints, considerable differences 
remained with respect to the respective historical, political and normative assessments of 
the two countries’ common past. These differences manifested themselves in statements 
on the “divergent legal views” of both sides, and in legitimate criticism from the Czech 
Jewish community regarding the inadequate recognition of the effects of the Holocaust on 
Czech Jews in the declaration. Furthermore, no agreement was reached on appointments 
to positions in the German-Czech Future Fund or on the definition of the fund’s future 
tasks. Disagreements were also manifested in another, scandalous case i.e. the initial 
blockage of payments from this fund to the last surviving victims of Nazi terror in the 
Czech Republic, where it was decided that their legitimate compensation claims, in con-
trast to the claims of SL members, were not to be transferred to succeeding generations. 
There are a number of factors underlying the ongoing difficulties which plague the 
process of Czech-German rapprochement. Of course, nationalistic and ethno-nationalistic 
stances exist on both sides of the Bavarian-Bohemian forest right up to the present day, 
but these positions represent a political, rather than an intellectual challenge. At the core 
of the communication problems on both sides are neither fear of renewed property losses 
in the former Sudeten German regions, nor a real or supposed repression of history in the 
Czech Republic, nor the complex muddle of political, material, legal and moral aspects 
which complicate the clarification of opposing standpoints. The key to the problem lies 
rather in the fact that democratic politicians on both sides differ substantially in their 
moral and normative assessments of World War II and its consequences. At the centre of 
this issue is the question why politicians, journalists, historians and representatives of the 
generation of first-hand witnesses who have the will to understand and who all appeal to 
the same laws and norms fail to reach a consensus in their assessment of the main histori-
cal processes. One of the most difficult questions in this context refers to the evaluation 
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of individual guilt and responsibility for large-scale crimes committed collectively during 
this ‘total war’ under conditions of total dictatorship, during which almost all remaining 
civil and private autonomy was suspended, and, along with it, the prerequisites for the 
perception and assessment of individual responsibility [Schwan 1997: 14ff]. Reflecting 
this dilemma are concepts requiring clarification, such as collective responsibilities, col-
lective guilt or the collective liability of citizens; these concepts are juxtaposed with ar-
guments connected with the issue of appropriate punishment for the crimes committed 
during World War II. Discussions of these issues always imply moral judgements on 
one’s own actions or the actions of others, but such judgements rarely become the subject 
of systematic consideration. The difficult moral discourse on the war, transfer and expul-
sion is not only complicated by the collision of contradictory positions from earlier con-
flicts, divergent experiences of suffering, and the divergent memories of those who 
experienced the war and post-war period first-hand; it is also burdened with attempts to 
link historical and contemporary moral horizons. 
2. Differences in German-Czech Moral Discourse 
It is not surprising that, within the current German-Czech dialogue advocates of the same 
values and principles arrive at different interpretations regarding the sphere of their appli-
cability, interpretations which are sometimes directly opposed. For example, despite their 
similar political ideals and close personal relationship, the former German Federal Presi-
dent, Richard von Weizsäcker, and Václav Havel, when evaluating key points of German-
Czech history, come to different conclusions. This was stressed by von Weizsäcker in his 
Prague speech at Charles University in December 1995: “Expulsion is a serious injustice 
(…) The expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia was the result of the capitulation of 
democracies in the face of dictatorship in Munich in1938 and a result of the forced occu-
pation of your country in March 1939 (…) However none of this means that expulsion 
and the expropriation decrees of 1945 and their cruel implementation become in any way 
acceptable. They were immoral, because they assumed the collective guilt of an entire 
group of people; guilt, however, like innocence, is always individual, never collective. 
The decrees were not legal acts, but were acts of war after the fact (…) That is why this 
year’s decision by the Brno High Court alarmed us to such an extent, because it was 
based, fifty years later, on an alleged collective responsibility and because it legitimates, 
on the basis of criminal law, earlier acts of injustice.”1 
Václav Havel, who underlined the Czech decision to forego claims against Ger-
many for the injustices suffered by Czechs during World War II, rejected all demands for 
compensation for “post-war resettlement” on the part of the Vertriebenenverbände, as 
well as calls for a revision of the Beneš decrees: “We too have attempted to give an ac-
count of our share of the responsibility for the offences which happened after the war, but 
we also haven’t the slightest intention of turning back history and repealing (…) our legal 
acts, which were long ago legitimately adopted by Parliament.”2 
The diverging assessments of central issues in German-Czech relations in these 
two speeches are obvious. Although on the German side, some self-critical voices do 
acknowledge the relationship between cause and effect, several influential spokespersons 
call for an unconditional moral condemnation of expulsion (P. Glotz). The moral assess-
                                                     
1) Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 January 1996. 
2) Lidové noviny 18. 2. 1995, extract in Prager Zeitung 23. 2. 1995. 
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ment thus is as follows: the terrible ‘injustice’ suffered by the Czechs at the hands of the 
Germans was followed by the ‘injustice’ of ‘transfer’. In this view, the wild, pogrom-like 
expulsions, the ‘transfer decisions’ reached in Potsdam and the Beneš decrees form a unit, 
because they are all reflections of a mistaken principle, that of collective guilt. In keeping 
with this line of thought, superficial comparisons, equating the Holocaust = expulsion = 
present-day ethnic cleansing are often put forward [Glotz 1995]. 
The Czech side considered such equations inadequate and therefore insisted on a 
more rigorous relationship between cause and effect in the joint German-Czech declara-
tions. The then Czech Prime Minister, Václav Klaus, referred to this point repeatedly and 
emphatically. He thus criticised the March 1995 joint declaration of German and Czech 
bishops because it constructed a “symmetry” with respect to the question of the guilt of 
both nations and lacked adequate recognition of chronology and causality: “We are not 
talking here of autonomous, mutually unconnected cases of failure and guilt” [Klaus 
1997: 373]. The Czech historian Václav Kural expressed the same thought thus: “The 
initiative and the primary guilt for the catastrophic change does not rest with the Czech 
side” [Handl and Kural 1994: 18]. That this emphasis on the causality of historical events 
was not exaggerated is demonstrated by the numerous attempts, above all on the part of 
the Sudeten Germans, to extract the problem of transfer from an international context and 
to completely disregard the relationship between cause and effect. This position was 
taken by of one of the most active spokespersons for Sudeten German demands, R. Hilf: 
“Who started it is perhaps as interesting a question as which came first, the chicken or the 
egg” [Hilf 1996: 34]. This relatively widespread opinion provoked an ironic observation 
by the well-known television commentator F. Küppersbusch: “If the Czechs had not ex-
pelled the Sudeten Germans in 1945, Hitler would not have occupied Czechoslovakia in 
1939. Right?”3 
From the moral point of view – as can often be heard on the Czech side – it is ar-
gued that many of those displaced experienced ‘injustice, but’ – but these measures can 
only be understood within the specific historical context and were necessary and legiti-
mate. The ‘transfer’ allegedly took place in agreement with the Allies. In his speeches, 
Václav Havel, repeatedly mentioned and condemned the moral repugnance of revenge as 
a motive in connection with forced resettlement and expulsion. However, he also speaks 
of the “legitimate” decision of Parliament when referring to the expropriation and expul-
sion decrees. On the cause and effect relationship he says: “We can entertain various 
opinions regarding the post-war transfer – and my critical standpoint is well-known – 
however, we may never separate it from the historical context and all those horrors which 
preceded and led to it ... The transfer (odsun) no doubt represented the end of co-
existence within a collective state. But the deadly blow which caused this was something 
else: the fatal failure of the majority of our inhabitants of German descent who gave pri-
ority to dictatorship, confrontation and violence – which Hitler’s National Socialism em-
bodied – over democracy, dialogue and tolerance, and who, by claiming a right to their 
homeland, in fact renounced their homeland.”4 
The former Czech Foreign Minister, Jiří Dienstbier, speaks of the application of the 
idea of collective guilt in post-war Czechoslovakia and also uses the term ethnic clean-
                                                     
3) ARD, 2. 6. 1996. 
4) Lidové noviny 18. 2. 1995. 
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sing in this context, but at the same time rejects any discussion of a possible repeal of the 
decrees.5 
Obviously, the question of motives is not irrelevant in making moral judgements, 
nor is the question of who started things; in fact, such issues have a high priority in the 
moral assessment of actions. It would seem that Kant’s analogy is clearly valid, according 
to which the standards used to gauge conduct between two nations should be the same as 
those used for relations between two private individuals. The Czech standpoint insists on 
the difference between the activity of one person (or a nation or ethnic group) who acts 
with criminal intent and another who becomes involved in crime as a victim and then acts 
unjustly. In his polemic attack on Tolstoy’s pacifism, T. G. Masaryk insisted on the fun-
damental difference between the assailant and the victim. The first is situated, in his opin-
ion, “in a wholly different mental condition than the one who defends himself’. It is 
exactly this difference which morally justifies the use of violence by the victim and leads 
to condemnation of violence perpetrated by the aggressor [Ludwig 1937: 100]. 
Both these lines of argument are incomplete. The equation frequently found in the 
speeches of German politicians – i.e. that one ‘injustice’ was followed by another – oblit-
erates too many moral differences. In this equation, many people were in fact ‘more 
equal’ than others. Thus it is only proper that the text of the Czech-German Declaration, 
as a product of laborious negotiation, states that the brutal Nazi regime laid the ground-
work for later expulsion and forced eviction.6 Nevertheless, this statement fails to do 
justice to the special character of the occupying regime during this period of ‘total war’ 
and the implementation of Nazi Umvolkungspolitik (‘repopulation policy’). 
Two aspects of the Czech position are noteworthy: first, the gap between legal jus-
tification and moral condemnation and second, the way in which this position illustrates 
the limits of the Kantian analogy between personal and collective action. In contrast to 
the deeds of individuals, it is impossible in the case of collectively perpetrated reprisals to 
determine unambiguously whether an injustice was committed as a result of the exagger-
ated reactions of traumatised victims, or whether planned crimes were committed deliber-
ately by groups; in the latter case, perpetrators would not be able to claim extenuating 
circumstances in individual court proceedings. In cases of group violence, it is impossible 
to unambiguously determine the aggressor and victim. 
Furthermore, it is striking that the – in my opinion – legitimate rejection of one-
sided Sudeten German claims to property restitution via revision of the so-called Beneš 
decrees led to a morally problematic defence of their ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’. They 
were ‘legal’ in the sense that they were in a legal form. And they were ‘legitimate’, in the 
sense that they were passed by a parliament legitimated by a sovereign people. Were they 
also ‘legitimate’ in a moral sense? Václav Havel’s clear condemnation of the revenge 
motive demonstrates that this was not the case. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the justifi-
cation of these Czech measures at the end of World War II, as quoted in Havel’s speech 
above, remains confined to the level of reasons of state, which – in my opinion – does not 
stand up to moral judgement. This position results from the fact that, to date, the Czech 
side has failed to conduct an assessment of the normative and legal implications of its 
historical actions and legal acts in the years 1945/46 from the perspective of today’s gen-
                                                     
5) Interview in Svobodné slovo 10. 2. 1996, Práce 26. 2. 1996. 
6) Compare article 2 of the declaration. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 11. 12. 1996. 
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erally accepted human rights and moral standards. Must one today defend the forced 
transfer as a legal act in order to maintain trust in the legal system? Would it not be more 
appropriate to acknowledge the legally binding character of the decrees and at the same 
time morally distance ourselves from them and clearly state that, from the perspective of 
today’s legal standards, the decrees are not – despite the clauses with exceptions for Ger-
man anti-fascists – compatible with the human rights guaranteed in the Czech constitu-
tion? The classification of past legal acts, treaties or agreements, which are today 
considered illegitimate, as legally binding by no means necessarily implies – as demon-
strated by the legal handling of the Munich Agreement of 1938 in the Federal Republic – 
a chain of further revisionist legal steps (for instance, restitution etc.). Such a position 
avoids the formula of ‘legal validity’ – as employed in the decision of the Czech Consti-
tutional Court – and its negative consequences for today’s jurisprudence. 
Every retrospective discussion about values is simultaneously an attempt to reach a 
moral self-understanding with respect to the past. Does an understanding of the historical 
context mean the legitimisation of past actions? Is it at all possible to generalise conclu-
sions? The question remains: how can war, expulsion, transfer and their perpetrators be 
fairly judged from today’s perspective? 
It is a striking phenomenon that one significant point that was clearly seen by the 
protagonists at the time is hardly recognised on both sides of the current German-Czech 
discussions, at least on the level of official policy. Curiously, it is precisely the sole di-
mension of the historic conflict that could provide something like a partial justification 
for the decision to implement expulsion (which is expressed in the phrase ‘historically 
understandable’): this was the character of World War II. This was not a war against 
states, but against peoples, ethnic groups (M. Walzer). World War II was not a classic 
national war of revision, but rather a war of conquest and a race war, which obliterated 
every law, convention and norm recognised at the time, and exceeded in its consequences 
all of the known dimensions of mass crime up to that period.7 
With regard to the German-Czech dialogue and given the singular quality of this 
racist war of extermination, one must acknowledge that the very concept of peaceful co-
existence of both peoples in a common state after the end of World War II was rather 
utopian. Taking into account the fact that in this ‘total war’ all moral boundaries fell, 
taking into account the systematic elimination of the democratic elites, the extraordinary 
and long-lasting suffering of the civilian population, and also the far-reaching institu-
tional and legal vacuum after the fall of the occupying regime, it was hardly possible to 
prevent acts of revenge in the form of expulsions and the decisions regarding forced 
transfer. This singular conflict formation, in which the terror regime of the protectorate 
manifested itself as an expression of genuine Greater German hegemonic goals, led the 
Czech side to collectively accuse all Germans and especially Sudeten Germans. The 
Sudeten Germans were held chiefly responsible for the destruction of the Czech democ-
racy and the subjection of the Czechs to Nazi dictatorship. All Sudeten Germans, includ-
ing those who were not obvious lackeys of the Nazi regime and even those who opposed 
it, were affected by the post-war policies and the ensuing violence to the same extent as 
the Nazi perpetrators. The political regulation of radicalised nationalist conflict is never 
                                                     
7) The German historian Klaus Hildebrandt in a discussion in ZDF: Hitler eine Bilanz von Guido 
Knopp 10. 12. 1995. Cf. also his volume: Deutsche Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler. Stutt-
gart 1995, p. 892. 
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an easy task and such conflicts can reach a stage of escalation which precludes any kind 
of compromise; in this case, the situation was severely exacerbated by a biologically 
charged definition of the nation. Moreover, there was no visible anti-Hitler opposition in 
Germany. German soldiers fought with extreme brutality up to the very end of the war 
and in spite of the futility of their actions. As a result, the original concept of distinguish-
ing between the German people and Hitler’s Germany was abandoned in the final phase 
of the war by the Western Allies, and all the more readily by those peoples who suffered 
directly at the hands of the Nazis. 
Hannah Arendt commented on this as follows: “Whether someone was a Nazi or 
anti-Nazi in Germany will only ever be determined by someone who can look into the 
human heart, into which, as everyone knows, human vision cannot penetrate. (…) Thus, 
even the most extreme slogan that this war has evoked on our side – that the only good 
German is a ‘dead German’ – has a basis in reality; we can only know that someone was 
truly opposed to the Nazis after they hanged him. We have no other proof.” [Arendt 1976: 
35] 
This led Arendt to the question of how one could face “being confronted with a 
people for whom the line that divides criminals from normal people, the guilty from the 
innocent, was so effectively erased, that tomorrow no one in Germany will know whether 
he is speaking to a secret hero or a former mass-murderer. Neither a definition of who is 
considered responsible nor the arrest of ‘war criminals’ can save us from this situation.” 
[Ibid.: 36ff] 
At the end of World War II, the practical impossibility of methodically ascertaining 
– a million times over – the guilt (or share of guilt) of individuals was self-evident; there-
fore, a substitute was found in moral generalisations. 
The thesis of collective guilt rests on the assumption that a person can be accused 
purely on the basis of membership in a defined group. This assumption is in such funda-
mental opposition to Western-liberal legal tenets that defending it would lead to a funda-
mental reassessment of the entire legal system. On the other hand, although the legal 
system rejects the notion of collectives which act as a unit, history in fact shows that they 
exist. There were real and effective divisions within national and ethnic collectives, 
which resulted, internally, in compulsory homogeneity and, seen from the outside, cam-
ouflaged all existing individual differences and internal forms of differentiation. The 
near-complete identity of nation and regime in Nazi Germany, the active collaboration of 
the German civilian population with the aims and methods of Nazi policy and with the 
Nazi war of extermination until its bitter end, in effect left the occupied nations no choice 
but to make political-moral generalisations based on national categories. This dilemma 
cannot be solved in retrospect. The conflicts of radicalised groups, which are enacted 
along the distinctions of ‘primordial’ traits (i.e. either immutable traits such as sex or skin 
colour or very stable identities such as nationality/ethnicity, native language, religion) 
create divisions that rule out compromise and produce in the generations involved irre-
versible ruptures, which the protagonists cannot repair on their own. Conflicts of this kind 
are often caught up in spiral of increasing tension, are immune to the usual forms of con-
flict regulation and often end in bloodshed.8 In extreme situations, any acknowledgement 
                                                     
8) Claus Offe referred to the special role of the conflicts of primordial groups in his lecture “Ho-
mogeneity and Democracy” in Bremen on Jan 1, 1996. 
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of differentiations in the ranks of the opponents is swept away. Recognising that such 
conflicts, once they have reached a certain level of violence and loss of moral boundaries, 
to a certain extent resemble natural catastrophes in their dynamics and seeming inevitabil-
ity can hardly be equated with nationalist partisanship in favour of one conflict party or 
the other. This recognition depends instead on one’s insight into the depth and the conse-
quences of the breach in modern civilisation which Nazi barbarism effected, and is as 
important for assessing such processes as the rejection and exposure of nationalist argu-
ments. 
Those who prepared and carried out population transfer measures in the specific 
historical context of World War II did not, and did not want to, commit ‘genocide’ 
against the Germans, as a significant portion of the Sudeten Germans still believes today. 
To label population transfer as genocide is to place the motives and moral grounds of 
those large-scale criminals who planned and carried out genocide on a par with those who 
attempted to stabilise peace in a ruined region charged with hatred. That such a compari-
son is not new is illustrated by correspondence between Herbert Marcus and Martin Hei-
degger in August 1947 and January 1948. Questioned about the reason for his silence 
about the Holocaust and his support for the Nazi cause in the 1930’s, Heidegger equated 
the behaviour of the Allies with Hitler’s Germany, replying that one need only exchange 
the word ‘East Germans’ for ‘Jews’; the only difference, he noted, was that the Nazis 
tried to cover up their bloody crimes, while the Allies acted openly. Marcuse replied that 
the logic of Heidegger’s arguments implied that extermination camps such as Buchen-
wald or Auschwitz should be preserved for ‘East Germans’ and only then would accounts 
be settled, and he continues: “If the difference between humanity and inhumanity is re-
duced to this omission, then this is the fault, within world history, of the Nazi system…” 
[Farías 1989: 374] 
This dispute also points up a fundamental moral distinction. There is an essential 
difference between the loss of property, which is very painful to the individual, and the 
loss of life or health, which cannot be remedied whatsoever. 
The core of the problem in the discourse taking place within the democratic spec-
trum on both sides rests, in my opinion, on the fact that German policy and discussion, 
besides pursuing the legitimate goal of pointing out the actual hardships of its civilian 
population during and after the war, is generally concerned with applying today’s moral 
and legal standards to the conflict constellations which arose in the immediate post-war 
period. The question which is overlooked in this perspective is whether a realistic alterna-
tive to collective punishment existed, given the civilisatory breach caused by the Nazis’ 
racist war of extermination and their occupation and Umvolkungspolitik. This question is 
not answered by distancing oneself from nationalism and lumping together what were 
obviously war crimes, violent acts of revenge against German civilians at the end of the 
war, and the decision to implement transfer – which was intended not only as punish-
ment, but also aimed at curbing violence and securing future peace – under the term ex-
pulsion and declaring it to be an indisputable injustice. The minimal requirement for 
moral plausibility in consideration of the special dimensions of Nazi crimes in the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe would be that German politics would neither permit 
legal claims or one-sided revisionist measures against the countries it had formerly in-
vaded, nor give the impression that it intended to lay such claims. Since in fact neither the 
majority of Germans – including the large majority of Sudeten Germans long since inte-
grated into Federal Germany – nor the majority of the political parties have any interests 
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in this direction, negotiations to date have suffered under a specific deformation, reflect-
ing the constellation of power in the Bonn coalition and the particular weight of the CSU 
until September 1998, rather than the general state of consciousness in Germany. 
What stands out on the Czech side (at least in the key official statements of politi-
cians and the Constitutional Court), is that by insisting on the relationship between cause 
and effect and by references to the decisions reached by the victorious Allies, the Czech 
side neglects the assessment of two important points: first, its own share in the realisation 
of the transfer measures and second, the actions and laws of the post-war period on the 
basis of current moral and legal standards proclaimed in the modern Czech constitution. 
The readiness to take up such a task, as I have pointed out above, constitutes the 
essential moral difference between a state which recognises that it is prepared, in an ex-
treme situation, to override norms that it otherwise upholds and a state that will not do so. 
This is precisely the point at which a democratic country must prove its interest in 
not allowing its appropriation of tradition to follow the motto ‘my country, right or 
wrong’. Hannah Arendt, who so compellingly analysed the culpability of the Germans in 
“total collaboration” with the Nazi regime, remarked in a different context that no state 
could survive co-operation with a totalitarian state undamaged. The same applies to the 
state of a population living for a long period under the occupation of a terrorist regime. 
Referring to this phenomenon is neither tantamount to moralising about history, nor is 
this a cheap vilification of the actors of that period. On the contrary – only by acknowl-
edging the difficult decisions and dilemmas which politicians and ordinary people faced 
and how they sometimes failed or suffered the loss of democratic substance, can we find 
evidence for the renewal of democratic traditions. For all moral judgements about historic 
processes which are reached today reflect the values and norms which should guide the 
contemporary political community. To re-fight the moral battles of times past would be 
absurd. A democrat can be distinguished from a nationalist precisely because he expects, 
in retrospect, high moral standards not only of his rivals, but also of himself. The recogni-
tion that a democratic state, to the extent that it employs the means of an aggressor, loses, 
in the same measure, its democratic substance, is quite compatible with a fair treatment of 
the partial failure of one’s own democratic elites. 
From the point of view of an ongoing development of legal standards and the crea-
tion of a higher level of justice for the present and the future, only one conclusion can be 
reached: There are no just transfers, even if they could be carried out by ‘humanitarian 
means’, and even if we can acknowledge that they appeared to be justified to the democ-
ratic politicians responsible, in view of the exceptional conditions caused by World War 
II. President Masaryk also foresaw this long before the monstrous scale of population 
resettlement during World War II and of forced expulsion resulting from post-war retri-
bution became reality: “The pan-Germans often proposed that significant national minori-
ties be relocated; the example of Zionism and emigration would seem to suggest such a 
remedy. It is more than doubtful, however, whether it is possible to carry out such an 
enterprise fairly and without force.” [Masaryk 1976: 52] 
Masaryk appears to have known that legitimate considerations such as, for exam-
ple, ensuring peace with the lowest long-term financial and organisational costs, consid-
eration of internal political factors etc., influenced the political decision-making of the 
political actors who had to make such difficult decisions (and thereby often, of necessity, 
circumvented the persons who were immediately involved) as much as considerations of 
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justice. For precisely this reason, decisions which are justified but which reflect interests 
other than the welfare of those directly affected are not necessarily just for the affected 
parties. Today, such gaps between conflicting interests are limited by the international 
commitment to upholding human rights and by increasing pressure to democratically 
legitimate such decisions. 
In Czech politics, the handling of laws pertaining to expropriation, expulsion and 
amnesty was marked by a defensive position taken up against a threatening avalanche of 
Sudeten German demands for revision. The many expropriations and transfers of property 
in former Czechoslovakia between 1938 and 1989 (aryanisation, the nationalisation of 
large industries by the people’s democracy, forced expropriation of property of Germans 
and Hungarians and of Czech collaborators with the Nazis, total collectivisation under the 
communists) would have justified a clear discussion by the reinstated people’s sovereign 
after 1989 – i.e., to reject all restitution of property after such a long period. Since this 
decision was not reached and only communist expropriations after 1948 were declared 
illegitimate, new legal problems emerged. These manifested themselves, for example, in 
the fact that Jewish property is not restituted to private individuals, which many Czech 
politicians consider scandalous because in these cases the return of property is denied due 
to fear of creating legal precedents that could unleash an avalanche of restitution claims. 
The political and moral handling of the decrees is, however, another matter. One of 
the main pillars of the decrees is an overturning of a basic principle of criminal law – the 
presumption of innocence. Instead, the accused is charged with proving his innocence. If 
an analogy comparable to this process in both extent and character is to be found any-
where, it is in the so-called Spruchkammer proceedings, which operated during the post-
war de-Nazification process in West Germany. These proceedings had a legal basis and 
their aim was to free Germany from National Socialism. Millions of members of the 
NSDAP, as well as party officials and functionaries, were divided into five categories 
according to the seriousness of their complicity. These categories ranged from chief cul-
prits, through party members, down to those acquitted of responsibility. 
The advocates of these proceedings countered criticism of the inversion of the as-
sumption of innocence with the argument that Nazi crimes were so evident that there 
existed a basic (prima facie) proof against National Socialism. Anyone who participated 
in the Nazi regime as a party-member or functionary fell under the likely assumption that 
he had actively supported National Socialism. While this procedure followed legal form, 
its initiators were aware that it was a case of combining criminal justice with a political 
purge. The proceedings focused not on the motivations of and concrete proofs against the 
accused, but on the deliberate discrimination of a political force that had to suffer the 
consequences of its self-made fiasco [Friedrich 1994: 137ff]. Here it would be appropri-
ate to ask to what extent the transfer decrees should be primarily regarded not as an in-
strument of political retaliation through ethnic cleansing in an exceptional situation – in 
which, as a result of a criminal war and Nazi population policies and the biological radi-
calisation of pre-existing ethnic conflicts, peaceful co-existence seemed impossible after 
the war – but rather as a valid, though no longer applicable, element of a democratic legal 
order based on human rights, as claimed in the Czech Constitutional Court’s decision. 
It also seems worthwhile to consider the following point: overturning the legal 
principle of the assumption of innocence is one matter when applied to political move-
ments, which one aims to disband for good reasons, and quite another when applied to an 
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entire ethnic group. While political groups (parties, movements), despite pressure to adapt 
under totalitarian conditions, imply the capacity of their members to make a political 
choice, this is not the case with nationality or ethnicity. The argumentation laid out by the 
Czech Constitutional Court is hardly adequate for satisfying one’s sense of justice: The 
abandonment of the assumption of innocence for Germans is legitimated with the argu-
ment that a German state no longer existed at the end of the war so that the specific status 
of an individual could only be determined on the basis of national identity. In the very 
next sentence, the court goes on to construct a correspondence between ethnic group and 
political convictions, based on the assumption that citizenship in the German Reich im-
plied the obligation to be loyal to the regime [Constitutional…1995: 91]. In view of re-
cent Czech experiences in an authoritarian state, one might expect Czech citizens to 
realise that, under the conditions found in a totalitarian state, it is impossible to reach a 
conclusion about individual behaviour or collective persuasion merely on the basis of an 
individual’s citizenship status. The forays into history found in the Constitutional Court’s 
decision focus on justifying the “legality” and “legitimacy” of the laws on expropriation 
and forced transfer and hardly send positive signals to the innocent people affected by 
these measures. Nor do they radiate the spirit of humanist ideals and human rights so 
often cited in the political culture of the Czech Republic. It is possible to agree with the 
Constitutional Court that the decrees were not a wanton act with respect to their legal 
form, and that they were sufficiently legitimated after the fact by Parliament, but it is 
difficult to agree that they represent a sanction that served to “secure the functions and the 
spirit of human rights and freedoms” [Ibid.: 96]. 
These differentiations are not merely verbal skirmishes. Law is not identical to jus-
tice, but the two cannot be at odds with each other for long in a democratic state. 
The arguments presented here reflect only a small segment of German-Czech rela-
tions and, within that segment, deal only with certain aspects of the mutual assessment of 
the most extreme period of German-Czech history.  
The moral dissent described here, if it is to be productive, must be linked on both 
sides to the understanding that the more rigorous one side is in its moral assessment of the 
behaviour of the other party, the more demanding the opposing party will be in the moral 
standards it applies to its behaviour and the responsibility for its consequences. 
Translated by Jiří Sirotek, Ondřej Formánek, John Comer 
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